DIGEST OF STAFF SECTIONAL REPORTS

1. Personnel and Administration: Having been constantly committed to combat since the landing on 9 January, it was natural to expect that sooner or later non-battle casualties would increase, and early in March the number of non-battle casualties reported rose sharply. To combat this condition a Division Rest Camp was opened on 13 March 1945, to handle 100 men from each infantry regiment, 45 from Division artillery units, 15 from the 6th Engineer Battalion and 10 from the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop. Personnel entered this camp for a 4 day rest, and, at the end of that time, were returned to their organizations. The results of this experiment in attempting to rest troops during an actual campaign was immediately reflected throughout the command. The Rest Camp remained in operation until 20 April 1945, when it was learned the Division would move to a relatively quiet sector.

Handicapped by the absence of any Philippine Civil Affairs unit attached to the Division during the greater part of the LUZON campaign, and by the lack of adequate personnel, equipment and authority, the Civil Affairs Section of the Division found it necessary to operate a quasi-FCAU unit, with particular emphasis being stressed on aiding the forward tactical units. On 9 January this section reached Blue Beach at H/450 and until 30 April 1945 the Civil Affairs Section regularly functioned within a short distance of the forward elements of the command. Frequently under enemy artillery and small arms fire, the section, by the very nature of its activities, often had to operate in remote barrios, unprotected by any of the combat units. It was early determined that the Division Civil Affairs Section must closely follow the tactical troops.

Procurement of sufficient labor for the Division and attached units has been the primary concern of the Civil Affairs Section throughout the campaign. Since H+3 hours on S-Day when 300 laborers had been procured on Blue Beach for unloading supplies and equipment, the Section has constantly met all demands of the Division units. By S+2 more than 800 laborers were being used daily by the 543d EBESR and some additional 500 civilians had been registered and made available for emergency use. On S+6 a FCAU unit of Sixth Army assumed the responsibility for furnishing labor on Blue Beach.

To reduce the incidence of disease in the Division areas, the Civil Affairs Section took immediate steps in liberated municipalities to establish civilian dispensaries and, where necessary, hospitals. With medical supplies obtained from the Division Surgeon, FCAU #18, 6th Army Medical Depot and captured Japanese stocks, the Section established free clinics in 18 municipalities, organized four hospitals, and supplied and operated a leprosarium. In addition, sanitary inspectors were appointed in each municipality to arrange for burial of civilian dead, regulate...
the disposal of garbage and waste, and otherwise control local sanitary conditions. With the evacuation of the MONTALBAN - SAN MATEO areas, 5000 evacuees were cared for by a traveling clinic covering the congested LA MESA area. In so far as possible, medical care for civilian sick and wounded was made the responsibility of civilian doctors and nurses, but they were aided immeasurably in their work by the 6th and 15th Portable Surgical Hospitals, the 29th Evacuation Hospital, the 6th Clearing Station and other Divisional medical units.

Municipal governments were reestablished in all liberated towns as soon as possible. Pre-war elected officials, when available, were appointed by the Section, with the approval of the Counter-Intelligence Corps, as temporary officials. Effective police forces were reorganized, schools were reopened, roads, public buildings and bridges were rebuilt, farmers were encouraged to return to their farms and local markets and stores to resume business. In each area the assistance of local Guerrillas was sought to help patrol the outlying districts and maintain order in the towns. Of major importance in restoring order to the communities were the restoring to active operation of five sugar mills, twenty-five rice mills and more than forty threshing machines providing food, incomes and steady employment to large groups of civilians.

The Civil Affairs Section of a Division should be equipped to operate independently of any other unit. Their activities in the forward areas are more important to a combat Division than those of RAU units in rear areas. The T/O should provide for 4 officers (1 Lt Col, 1 Capt, 2 lts) and 10 enlisted men. The T/E should include two 1/4 ton trucks, 1 1/4 ton trailer, one 3/4 ton truck and one 2-1/2 ton truck. Small stoves, (stove, cooking, gasoline M-1942, two burner) and cooking utensils should also be provided. This unit would then be completely self sustaining.

2. Intelligence: Activities of special intelligence sections have amply justified their existence. The 6th Division Language Detachment, now known as the 169th Language Detachment, entered the LUZON campaign an experienced team which had participated in two NEW GUINEA operations. Prior to embarking from SAMSAPOR, this detachment conducted extensive "missionary" work, instructing our troops as to the necessity for the collection and prompt evacuation of intelligence material, "finds" which too often fell into the hands of souvenir collectors, for appraisal. This instruction was based on actual experiences. Many instances were pointed out where troops had forwarded to G-2 seemingly worthless enemy documents and articles which yielded information that contributed directly to the enemy's defeat and saved American lives.

Nisei teams of 2 men were attached to the 1st and 20th Infantry Regiments prior to the landing. It was later found more profitable to recall these personnel to the Division detachment, both as a precaution against their loss in hotly contested areas and to expedite the handling.
of captured documents and prisoners reaching the detachment from other sources.

In addition to the interrogation of PW's and the processing of captured enemy documents, the Language Detachment participated in such miscellaneous activities as writing special intelligence bulletins relating to Japanese holidays, customs, prisoners, and psychology, radio and monitoring, clearing souvenirs, and instructing in basic Japanese.

On several occasions, language section personnel escorted Jap PW's in forward areas where the captured Japs pointed out the positions of their own troops, enticed fellow soldiers to surrender, or attempted to substantiate statements made during interrogation which had conflicted with Order of Battle information.

The Division Order of Battle Team has been an extremely valuable addition to the G-2 Section, and has become an indispensable agency for evaluating enemy intelligence and appreciating the enemy situation. Prior to S-Day the OOB Team had studied all possible sources of enemy information and established the identification and probable dispositions of major units which might be encountered in the Division zone.

With the first enemy contact and enemy documents received, the OOB Team enlarged their files to assist G-2 with augmented information. When the first PW was brought in, the OOB officer witnessed the interrogation and assisted language personnel by checking the veracity of the PW's story and supplying the interpreter with facts to be used in his questions.

Newly organized and fresh from the states, the 113th Photo Interpretation Team has been of invaluable assistance to the G-2 Section. This unit investigated all formal reports from higher echelon intelligence agencies pertaining to the location of Jap strong points, possible coastal defenses and areas of activity, compared this information with their own interpretation of available aerial photographs, and prepared overlays to accompany the initial field order. Each sortie flown prior to the operation was annotated and supplied immediately to Unit Commanders, who utilized the photos in pre-invasion planning.

The team was responsible for the procurement and distribution of all aerial photographs, photomaps, obliques, and mosaics. A multitude of problems presented themselves when existing maps were found to be inaccurate, so the PIU constructed uncontrolled mosaics from the best available photographs. Pending the printing of these mosaics, aerial photographs were gridded and supplied to units. The mosaics were produced by Army Topographic organizations and quickly distributed.

Mosaics were used almost exclusively during the major portion of the campaign. Annotation of mosaics with current findings proved
also to be an effective means of recording terrain and tactical information gained through photo interpretation.

The PIU was a factor which contributed greatly to smooth intelligence operations. The unit served to check all intelligence against actual visual records, and provided advance information of the terrain and enemy.

3. Air Support: In the initial phases of the M-1 operation the 6th Division made little use of air support because of the scarcity of suitable targets. Until forward elements reached the KNO RIVER, the attached JASCO unit handled what little air support was needed. Beginning during the climax of the CARABAN HILLS fight Support Aircraft Parties from the 5th Air Force controlled the Division's strikes. In late February a special staff section, from the G-3 Section, was detailed to work up the air targets and submit requests to the Support Air Party. At the same time infantry officers in each of the regiments took over the bulk of the ground control work. In April the infantry division T/O was amended to provide for an Air Ground Liaison Officer in the G-3 Section.

The following procedure was worked out and has been used very satisfactorily. Requests for air strikes (with the primary mission of closely supporting the infantry regiments) were originated by unit commanders and staff officers. As a rule requests from unit commanders were initiated 24 hours in advance. This was not always practical, as regimental commanders often could not know until late afternoon what targets they wanted bombed next morning. To circumvent this difficulty the Division AGLO would pick profitable alternate targets from PIU and other intelligence data. Targets selected, the AGLO worked up the necessary strike data, drew up requests, and submitted them to the SAPO, who approved or disapproved them. Approved requests were forwarded through SAP radio channels to the controlling Corps and supporting Bomb Wing simultaneously. Silence by Corps signified approval, and the Bomb Wing would then schedule strikes. The AGLO was informed as to the number and type of planes, their bomb loads, and the time over target for each strike, and he in turn passed this on to the regimental AGLO.

As planes orbited in the target area, the SAP would contact the flight leaders, then turn the planes over to one of the regimental AGLO's, who would talk the planes to their target from a regimental or battalion OP's which afforded an unrestricted view of the impact area.

This system made for excellent close support. From their vantage points, using supporting artillery or mortars to mark targets with WP, regimental air officers were able to direct perfect strikes on objectives only a few hundred yards from our troops. In operations against the SHIBU LINE it was not unusual to run 7 to 10 strikes a day. Seven was found to be about the maximum which could be worked in most efficiently. Strikes scheduled earlier than 0630 frequently had to be called off because of weather conditions.
All three regimental AGLO's were alerted at their OP's throughout the day, so that if a strike had to be diverted from one area due to cloud conditions or unexpected developments in the ground situation one of the other AGLO's could take over the flight. The same was true when flights orbited in too rapid succession, though occasionally two strikes were run simultaneously from two different regimental OP's. Strikes as a rule were scheduled one hour apart. This time schedule was highly flexible, and, as all forward controllers were standing by, the shifting of a flight or flights to take care of targets of opportunity could be easily handled.

 Strikes were so planned that while immediate objectives of infantry attacks were thoroughly saturated, other strikes were being directed against the enemy's supply dumps and troop concentration areas beyond the immediate front. In connection with designated bomb targets, flights were given strafing missions along draws and trails known to be used by the enemy. This amounted to an armed reconnaissance. The use of 6 to 7 flights, spaced throughout the day and planned to achieve this overall coverage of the Division's sector, gave the Division a virtual air alert and restricted the enemy's movements to nocturnal activities.

 Air photo-maps compiled by the Division PIU and printed by Corps engineers were found to be most useful as reference maps in directing flight leaders to target areas. When possible, copies were forwarded to the supporting Bomb Wing, so that flight leaders could actually study these maps as well as the terrain while forward controllers described the targets.

 During the period 15 June to 30 June ninety percent of all air strikes were directed by a controller flying in an L-5 type aircraft. The mountainous terrain in the KLAMPAN area made ground control practically impossible. By the use of airborne controllers, strikes were successfully conducted both in close support and well in advance of forward elements. During this period 761 sorties were flown and 358 tons of demolitions and 113,500 gallons of Napalm were dropped on the enemy.

 4. Replacement Training: One of the G-3's chief problems in combat is the training of replacements. When the tactical situation permitted, elements of the Division not in contact with the enemy were assembled in rear areas for rehabilitation and training. During these periods units were able to give attention to equipment maintenance and shortages, to correct minor deficiencies in training, and to supplement the basic training of replacements. Replacements received while a unit was heavily engaged in combat were assembled in rear areas for a brief indoctrination and training period under the supervision of qualified officers and non-commissioned officers. Later, when the Division occupied a quiet sector for a few weeks, a Division Replacement Training Camp was set up in the area West of FORT STOTSENBURG.

 At the Division Replacement Training Center replacements, in
groups of approximately three hundred, were given a two weeks' intensive training course. Personnel received instruction from officers and men of the units to which they would be assigned. All of these instructors had combat experience and fully appreciated the importance of their task. Training included the firing of weapons, scouting and patrolling, sketching, assault team work, the operation of ambushes, and small unit tactics. The fact that a few Japs still roamed the training area was an added incentive to the new troops, and they entered into their training with much enthusiasm.

5. Supply: In the objective area unloading was hampered by an unsuitable beach, rough surf, and initial shortage of civilian labor, and by pilferage on the part of both military and civilian personnel. Immediately upon landing, attached Quartermaster troops went under the operational control of the Shore Party commander. As the action moved inland, the 6th Quartermaster Company followed closely the attacking troops, and truckheads were habitually established within 15 miles of forward elements.

During the period S-Day through S / 22, it was necessary to issue 125,063 rations to units other than the Division and attached units, as many organizations either landed on the beach without any "K" rations or were to draw them from inland bases which were not yet established. All units arriving in the objective area must realize the necessity for bringing the prescribed quantity of rations with them. This should be emphasized particularly to units arriving in echelons later than S-Day.

"K" and "C" rations were not available in the early stages of the operation. These are the only suitable types for patrol use, and it is recommended that hereafter a larger percentage of "K" and "C" rations be carried in the unit supply, in preference to "10-in-1".

A small quantity of essential Class II and IV items, such as shoes, HBTs and socks was landed mobile loaded on Quartermaster Company trucks. The 100 tons of Class II and IV which arrived on S / 2 did not reach shore until S / 14. Had it not been for the small quantity brought in on S-Day, it would have been impossible to provide troops with clothing to replace that lost or destroyed.

It is recommended that in future operations, ten trucks of the Quartermaster Company be mobile loaded, to land not later than S / 2, with ten day's supply of the following: jackets and trousers, HBT; socks, wool, light; canteens and covers; canteen cups; helmets, liners, head and neck bands; bolts, cartridge and pistol; packs, combat, field; ponchos; watercans; scrubbing brushes, soap and toilet paper. Such items, if bulk loaded, will not get ashore in time to replace those lost in landing operations and initial combat, because of the necessarily higher priorities for unloading vehicles, rations and PCL.
Ten day supplies of all Class II and IV items should be scheduled to arrive on S+2, S+12 and S+22. They should not be scheduled for later arrival, as low priorities will delay their unloading for approximately a week. As soon as possible, all such Class II and IV should be turned over to a Base Section or Army Supply Point, as resupply ships do not have a sufficient supply of certain controlled items to meet demands.

Throughout the initial phases of the operation, all POL was handled in 55 gallon drums. It would have been impossible for the limited number of supply personnel to have handled POL in 5 gallon cans. When bulk plants were opened, V-80 lubricants were drawn in bulk by tank trucks equipped with converted engineer ponton cubes, for refilling empty unit 55 gallon drums at the Division dump. This procedure is recommended for future operations.

6. Medical: The Division’s organic medical units were ashore by 1200 on S-Day. Attached units included two additional collecting companies, one clearing company, three portable surgical hospitals, and one evacuation hospital. Within the first week, the 6th Portable Surgical Hospital, the 608th Clearing Company and the 29th Evacuation Hospital reverted to Army or Corps control, as medical facilities had been provided to care for more casualties than were suffered initially.

While military casualties were low during the initial phase, caring for civilians was a pressing military problem. The 6th Portable Surgical Hospital was in operation by 1100 on S-Day, with its staff augmented to care for about 250 civilian casualties resulting from naval artillery preparation. From then on, medical units were besieged by sick civilians during the first few days in each area newly entered by American forces.

During the entire advance south from LINGAYEN GULF, the Clearing Company operated as two platoons, with one platoon "leapfrogging" the other as it was necessary to bring a clearing station closer to the front lines. At MUNOZ, where casualties were heavy, a clearing platoon was set up four miles from the front. At MUNOZ, heat exhaustion cases appeared for the first time in this campaign.

Many concussion and blast injury cases were evacuated during the attack on the SHIBU LINE. Battle and non-battle casualties were highest during the month of April, when the troops were fighting not only against stubborn resistance by the enemy, but also flies, tropical heat and general exhaustion resulting from long periods of combat.

The Division Medical Supply landed at LINGAYEN with a 30-day stock, and other units with a 10-day medical supply. These had been secured with great difficulty prior to embarkation at SANSAPOR. On LUZON, the medical supply situation was excellent. Various base depots
were relatively convenient, although at times truck travel was necessary to secure critical items.

Personnel changes among officers and enlisted men were great enough to cause anxiety. For example, from 1 April to 30 June, the Division Medical Service functioned with an average shortage of 10 medical officers and an average 11% shortage of enlisted personnel in the infantry medical detachments.

During the early days of the campaign, almost any available source of clear water was used for drinking. As the rate of communicable disease increased, it became imperative to assure a water supply free of pathogenic organisms. Accordingly, streams, because of their high pollution by human and animal wastes and decomposition products, were avoided as a source of supply. Wells were sunk near the banks of swiftly moving streams, and the water filtered and chlorinated to four parts per million. This procedure assured the removal of amoebic cysts, and provided chlorination sufficient to kill the cercarial forms of Schistosomes.

The ration, as a health factor, was monotonous and not too wholesome. The overly frequent appearance of vienna sausage, canned pork or beef, lunch meats, beans and dehydrated foods, without benefit of palate stimulators such as spices, catsup, pickles and relishes, contributed to the complaints of "loss of appetite". During May and June the ration slowly improved.

The first troops in new areas were welcomed by clouds of flies, the presence of which caused a large number of diarrheal diseases. A continuous campaign against disease-bearing and irritating flies was waged, using all standard methods of control, as soon as an area was occupied. Mosquito control activities were carried on by the Division, in addition to the work of Army and Corps units.

The incidence of venereal disease rose as troops came once more into areas where there was a civilian population. Chancroids were common. There were many cases of "Gonorrea New", but syphilis cases were few. To counter-balance this trend, the program of sex hygiene lectures was intensified, a 24-hour a day supply of mechanical and chemical prophylactics was made available, and "Pro" stations were increased in number and prominently marked. Proper follow-up procedures for tests and treatment of cases returning from hospitals were established. Efforts to enlist the cooperation of civilian authorities and health officers were unsuccessful. It devolved upon the Division Medical Service to contact sources of infection and to encourage them to report to PCAU dispensaries for examination and treatment. Those that failed to comply were placed "off limits".

The case rate for Hepatitis was high during the short, so-called "rest phase" but dropped rapidly during June. The main efforts to control
this disease have been directed toward the reduction of the fly pop-
ulation, improving sanitation and isolation of all contacts or sus-
pects.

The malaria rate was brought down by an increase in the dosage
of atabrine to two tablets per day per man. An intensified publicity
campaign on malaria discipline was inaugurated.

The element of fatigue contributed greatly to the number of
psychoneurotic cases admitted, particularly during the first 26 days
of April. The Division rest camp that was operated during April pro-
duced gratifying results. During June, there was an increase in psycho-
neurotic cases. Among the reasons for this were high ASR scores making
men reluctant to jeopardize themselves, the arrival of unscreened re-
placements and a move into mountainous jungle terrain. On the other
hand, there were fewer mental casualties caused by less artillery and
mortar fire. Men were sometimes sent back from hospitals with promises
of easier jobs which failed to materialize. This too aggravated the
general situation.

Minor injuries that produced open wounds attracted hungry
flies like a magnet, with the result that many tender purulent ulcers
were present on the hands of front line troops. They were resistant
to practically all standard forms of treatment but were quickly cured by
the judicious use of penicillin solution and ointments.

7. Chemical Warfare: Chemical Warfare offensive weapons were
used extensively throughout the Division's operations on LUZON. Chemical
mortars, employed in direct support of the attacking regiments, were
normally attached one company to a regiment and one platoon to a bat-
talion. Platoon positions were usually well forward, the platoon
leader staying with the battalion commander at his forward OP. Platoons
provided forward observer parties to accompany rifle companies, upon
request. The mortars were usually employed in battery fire, although
occasionally a single gun would be registered on a target out of reach
of 81mm mortars.

During the eleven day battle of the CABARUAN HILLS, nearly
7000 rounds of 4.2 mortar ammunition and 1300 WP grenades were expended.
Company "A", 98th Chemical Battalion used 3700 rounds of 4.2 ammunition
at MUNOZ, while assaulting infantrymen threw 1700 WP grenades. One
platoon of 4.2 mortars was credited with five enemy tanks in one day
at MUNOZ.

Flame throwers, WP and demolitions were used with great suc-
cess in both battles. Flame throwers were most successful when employed
by specially trained assault teams. They were particularly valuable in
the CABARUAN HILLS for burning out snipers located in bamboo thickets.
The Japanese soldier fears the flame thrower to the extent that often
after only one burst near him, he abandons his post to be killed by
small arms fire.

9 SECRET
WP grenades were very instrumental in reducing enemy positions in the CABARANS, particularly in flushing the enemy out of holes. There were no instances reported in which WP grenades have been thrown back by the Japanese. Our infantrymen believe that the Japs are so afraid of the WP grenades that they will not touch them. At HUNZU, WP grenades thrown into pill-boxes or bunkers usually resulted in Japs abandoning their holes with clothes burning and escape their only thought. Also, WP grenades were often used to great advantage as local smoke screens for assault elements.

In operations against the SHIMBU LINE WP grenades and flame throwers alike were instrumental in driving the enemy from the many elaborate caves and wooded ravines encountered. Some units made booby traps out of these grenades, preferring them to fragmentation or concussion grenades for this purpose.

The outstanding use for chemical warfare weapons in the SHIMBU LINE battle was the use of screening smokes to deny the enemy observation during infantry attacks, to cover the construction of supply roads, and to screen carrying parties and the evacuation of wounded. In laying these screens, mortars, artillery and planes cooperated with unusual success. Some of these screens for attacks on MT MATAHABA and MT FACA-TUAGAN covered several thousand yards of terrain and were maintained for from 6 to 8 hours.

Both WP shells and grenades were used extensively to burn off heavily vegetated areas. On numerous occasions grass fires were started which flushed Japs out into the open. Frequent air strikes employing Napalm were used similarly. Once heavily forested MT ORO was almost completely denuded by such strikes. Enemy supply dumps were particularly vulnerable to our incendiaries. Thermite incendiary grenades were not used a great deal, but were occasionally useful in destroying enemy dumps and materiel.

The Chemical Service unit attached to the Division throughout the operation has been indispensable in operating the Division Chemical Dump, even though handicapped by a lack of proper equipment. The Chemical Service platoon as now organized lacks mass facilities and has insufficient cargo trucks for moving the Division's needed chemical ammunition.

Pre-invasion plans formulated for collecting gas masks worked exceptionally well, the loss of masks for the entire Division and attacked units being only 2%. As the operation progressed, all Class II and IV chemical warfare equipment was turned in to Base "M", and the gas masks of each unit were packed in gas-proof sacks and stored in warehouses with organizational impediments.

3. Ordnance:

The 706th Ordnance (Li) Company was supplemented in the early phases of the M-1 Operation by the 48th Ordnance (Mi) Company,