In the same period, when a convoy of self-propelled artillery was held up by a strong enemy roadblock, Technical Sergeant Roy P. Hanson crawled to the block under heavy machine-gun fire, sawed the key log in half, then made two trips to attach chains to the supporting logs, after which the SPMs found it easy to collapse the roadblock and continue the advance, while Hanson led a patrol to eliminate the enemy force covering the road position. Two enemy machine-gun crews and nine snipers were killed by Staff Sergeant Walter L. McDonald, Private First Class William T. Copling, Private First Class James J. Mooney and Private First Class John P. White when they volunteered to flank enemy positions that had pinned down their platoon. Private First Class Mortimer Roth, medical aid man with the Sykesmen, crawled to a position only fifty yards from an enemy machine gun to render medical aid to three wounded men, remaining with them under heavy fire until others could work their way forward and help evacuate the casualties.

During a counterattack on the 15th, Technical Sergeant Russel E. Wright led a four-man patrol to the crest of a near-by ridge to help repel the attacking enemy, killing four Nips and directing rifle and mortar fire on concentrations of enemy troops before they could launch a major counterattack. As the advance countined, Technical Ser-
28 JUNE - 30 JUNE - CONDUCTED
COMBAT PATROLS TO KAYAPA
AND TRAILS TO NORTH

23 JUNE
22 JUNE
20 JUNE SANTA ROSA
21 JUNE

PINGKIAN-KAYAPA AREA
14-JUNE-30 JUNE
1945

SCALE
1000 5000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 YARDS
Sergeant Arnold Witte and Private First Class Walter E. Swearingen assaulted four machine-gun positions that had held up their company in a narrow defile, destroying the four guns and gun crews with grenades and rifle fire. Lieutenant Colonel Floyd H. Simmons crawled forward under a hail of bullets to evacuate a lead scout who had been wounded and pinned down by enemy fire. Private First Class John J. Morgan ran through an enemy machine-gun fire lane four times to drag four wounded men to safety. Technical Sergeant Herbert J. Wesolowski destroyed an enemy machine gun with two grenades and killed three riflemen with his rifle after his platoon had been pinned down by the strongpoint. Private First Class George W. Snyder stood in the open road firing his tommy-gun at an enemy ambush after his motorized patrol had been stopped by concentrated fire, giving the drivers sufficient time to turn the vehicles around, then continued firing at the enemy while hanging on the side of the vehicle until the patrol was out of range. Lieutenant Colonel Arthur C. Bonycastle, after moving up with the foremost elements of his battalion to direct artillery and mortar fire on the enemy, stood up in the face of intense enemy fire to point out targets for the direct fire of friendly tanks, remaining in full view of the enemy until the job was completed.

* * *

While the 20th was moving west from Highway 5, the 63d Infantry started the Division's northward push up Highway 4. On 13 June the 3d Battalion crossed the Lamut River north of Bagabag and advanced approximately 3,000 yards with no enemy contact. On the following day an advance of 2,000 yards brought elements of the battalion into contact with an estimated Jap company moving south on the same road. Company I took the initiative, occupied the commanding ground in the area by dusk, and drove off a counterattack at dawn the next morning. The attack continued through Pawayan, Companies K and L and the 6th Recon overrunning several roadblocks and capturing a large motor pool and supply area. Another push brought the doughs halfway to Bolog, where the battalion extended its patrolling activities to mop up bypassed areas. Jap ambushed along the heavily wooded road destroyed one of our armored cars and three trucks, while Company I again repulsed a counterattack by an estimated company of the enemy. Artillery fire was received for the first time.
on 18 June when fifty rounds of 105mm fell near the gun positions of the 53d Field Artillery Battalion.

On 20 June the 3d Battalion launched new attacks that in three days of sharp fighting advanced them to within 2,000 yards of Bolog, knocking out numerous machine guns, mortar positions and camouflaged emplacements in the drive. Two more counterattacks were repulsed, but the Nips did succeed in ambushing another supply convoy, inflicting some casualties among both personnel and vehicles by machine-gun fire and satchel charges. On 24 June the 1st Battalion moved through the 3d Battalion lines following a half-hour artillery preparation, gaining 800 yards against heavy machine-gun and rifle fire poured on the doughs from the tops of steep narrow ridges overlooking the open routes of approach. Patrols from the 2d Battalion worked around to the west of Highway 4, seeking routes of approach to the northwest. That night banzai attacks on several of the battalion and company perimeters were repulsed.

The attack on Bolog moved steadily ahead, supported by artillery, tanks and halftracks mounting quadruple .50-caliber machine guns. A mine field that delayed the advance was removed by the 6th Engineers. The junction of old and new Highway 4 southwest of Bolog was captured. Steep cliffs were scaled by the advancing troops, and the quadruple .50s were used to clean out wooded draws in place of time-consuming infantry patrols. On the 29th Bolog was captured, and the last day of the month found both the 1st and 2d Battalions in position north of the town prepared to continue the drive up both branches of Highway 4.

Among the recon troopers who distinguished themselves while convoysing supply trains through the heavily wooded area to Fayawan and Bolog were Technician Fifth Grade Albert H. Green, Jr., who drew withering enemy fire on himself by repeatedly firing his 37mm gun into enemy positions that had ambushed the convoy and damaged the lead car, and who, after covering the dismounting and withdrawal of the crew, turned his antitank gun on the damaged vehicle to prevent its falling into enemy hands; Captain Jean E. LaPlace, commanding officer of the troop, who, when one of his convoys was ambushed, so maneuvered the cars and directed the troopers' fire while himself under constant enemy fire that the convoy was able to destroy numerous .50- and .50-caliber machine guns and several pole charges that had been intended for our supply trucks; and Technician Fifth Grade James F. Eickmann, whose vehicle was ambushed after he had destroyed one enemy roadside emplacement, and who was killed as he ran into the heavy thicket alongside the road to charge the new enemy position while three men wounded by the enemy satchel charge were being evacuated.

The 63d Infantrymen advancing up Highway 4 provided many instances of individual bravery under fire: Technical Sergeant Carl J. Haberman's flank attack on an enemy position which had halted his platoon, resulting in the destruction of one enemy machine gun, three gunners and two supporting riflemen; the encirclement of a strong enemy posi-
Felix P. Lusk crawled forward and attacked an enemy-held cave with grenades, killing three. Lieutenant Sunburn Sutherland was evacuating a wounded man from a forward position when a sniper’s bullet found its mark, passing completely through Sutherland’s helmet. Momentarily stunned by the terrific impact, he resumed his trip across the fire-swept area, carrying his burden to a place of safety.

* * *

On 1 July the Sightseeing 6th passed to the control of XIV Corps and Eighth Army. In addition to continuing the advance already started by the 63d Infantry, the Division was given another mission by Corps, involving the relief of the 57th Division units along Highway 5 in the southern part of the Cagayan Valley and the destruction of two organized enemy forces known to be in the hills along the highway. The new mission was turned over to the 20th Infantry, with 3d Platoon of the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop attached. By 5 July the relief was completed and the Sykesmen took over along Highway 5 between the Magat River and Ilagan.

The 1st Battalion secured the town of Jones and patrolled extensively to the south along the Dibuluan and Dabubu Rivers, but no organized resistance was encountered. The 2d Battalion also made only scattered contacts in the Cabatuan area, most of them with stragglers who had escaped from the upper Cagayan Valley. The heaviest action during the period occurred in that part of the 3d Battalion sector east of Naguilian, where the only trail lead-
ing to the Jap stronghold ran through the deepest jungles of Luzon and across mountains up to 4,000 feet in elevation. The Sykesmen of the 3d Battalion overran several enemy strongpoints along the wooded trail, then ran into heavy weather that brought operations to a standstill for five days. Leaving jeeps, weasels and artillery far behind, the doughboys finally completed their eastward drive with a three-day march over slippery mountain trails that only foot soldiers without packs could negotiate. While advancing in the vicinity of Dibuluan, the platoon led by Lieutenant Leo N. Huscia was hit by intense machine-gun and sniper fire as it was crossing a long narrow bridge. He led the doughys in a quick dash across the bridge, established positions on the far side, then discovered he had lost radio contact with the remainder of his company. Huscia himself ran the gauntlet of enemy fire back across the narrow bridge to carry the information on the enemy dispositions to the company command post, immediately rejoining his platoon to continue the advance. Private First Class Vester Reeder, a lead scout, was wounded twice while crossing a river far in advance of his platoon, but despite his wounds took up a position on the far shore from which he directed accurate mortar and machine-gun fire that destroyed the enemy positions impeding the advance. In the same area, after several attempts to evacuate a wounded man from the far side of the river had been driven back by enemy fire, Sergeant Michael A. Kozlak and Private First Class Leopoldo J. Ceballos braved the heavy fire to dash through open ground to the river bank, swim across the river, administer first aid to the casualty, and carry him back across the river to a place of safety. When the 20th and Recon were withdrawn from the area on 23 July they had killed 382 Japs and taken 207 prisoners of war while their own losses had been two killed and fifteen wounded.

The major problem that faced the 63d Infantry in the continuation of its drive up both old and new Highway 4 was one of supply and evacuation. To secure the roads leading to Kiangnan would require the crossing of deep rocky gorges and the scaling of precipitous mountain heights by troops who could be supplied only by hand-carry. All along the road the enemy had destroyed bridges, planted mines, caused landslides, dug tank traps and in some places actually blown the road bed off the face of the cliff. Heavy rains that hit the area almost every evening also delayed operations by covering the roads with sticky mud and blocking traffic with landslides.

Hundreds of spear-carrying Ifugaos from the hills around Bolog and many civilians from Bagabag and Solano were recruited to carry ammunition, water and rations to the forward elements and to help evacuate wounded, while the Sightseers’ Engineers worked feverishly on the endless task of repairing and maintaining the unsurfaced roads.

On 2 July, while a reinforced platoon of the 1st Battalion pushed up the new highway, the 2d Battalion advanced along the old Highway 4, overrunning small delaying positions until elements of Company G ran into strong opposition on the high ground known as Lane’s Ridge. Frontal assaults were stopped by heavy concentrations of enemy fire during 5-6 July, and flanking attacks were forced
back by the impenetrable thickets and impassable gorges that lay on each side of the ridge. The strong enemy positions on the slope were pounded by Division Artillery and by Napalm air strikes, and on 7 July the 2d Battalion succeeded in taking the forward slope.

Continuing the advance, leading elements uncovered on the reverse slope of the ridge another strong defensive position, consisting of 55 mutually supporting emplacements, including 13 pillboxes and 22 caves, with enemy riflemen and machine gunners well dug in. Following a heavy artillery and mortar preparation, with the artillery’s VT-fuzed shells again causing heavy enemy casualties even in the covered positions, the hill was stormed by the 2d Battalion doughs under cover of a smoke screen and strafing fires of quad-50s. A banzai attack on the newly won position on the night of 8 July raised to more than 150 the number of enemy killed in the Lane’s Ridge battle.

With the last major defensive position before Kiangnan secured, the 1st and 3d Battalions continued the drive for the town against scattered opposition. Delayed by enemy fire, landslides, tank traps and land mines, the 1st Battalion moved up old Highway 4 supported by four tanks and a quad-50 while the 3d pushed through a series of enemy delaying positions and roadblocks along the precipitous Lbulao River gorge, turned off the highway to the west and joined the 1st Battalion to move together into what was left of Kiangnan.

In the first attacks on Lane’s Ridge, Private First Class Claude P. Leonard, Jr., reached the crest of an adjacent ridge against heavy fire, killed three machine gunners with hand grenades, and turned the gun on enemy positions, causing considerable damage among the enemy until he was killed by a sniper’s bullet. Though his company was forced to withdraw by the intensity of the enemy fire, Technical Sergeant Thomas F. Slater crawled forward in an effort to evacuate Leonard. On finding him already dead, he carried the body down the fire-swept ridge. On the same day Sergeant Henry Boothe justified his Kentucky background when he ran into several of the enemy on a narrow mountain trail. After killing two Nips who tried to bayonet him, Boothe killed five out of six who were setting up an ambush on the trail. Backing off alongside the road to reload, he spotted five more enemy coming up a draw and killed two of them, the rest scattering in the woods. Boothe turned toward his platoon to find two more Nips charging his platoon sergeant. Firing quickly from the hip, he killed both of them. Sergeant Robert N. Wilmott saved his platoon from heavy casualties when, after it had
been pinned down by murderous cross fire of enemy machine guns, he crawled forward to one of the positions and tossed grenades into the emplacement to silence the gun and kill the crew.

On separate occasions during the attack Private First Class J. L. Smith, Staff Sergeant Frank A. Jones and Private First Class Don J. Stevens crawled forward under intense fire to evacuate wounded comrades, while Sergeant Boyd Middleton remained in an exposed position at the crest of a ridge, pouring heavy fire into strong enemy positions to cover the evacuation of casualties and the withdrawal of his squad from a vulnerable position on the side of the ridge.

From 12-24 July the 63d Infantry limited its operations to searching out and destroying the enemy remnants in the Kiangan area. During this period, the supply and evacuation problem became acute as continuing heavy rains and high winds hampered the engineer operations on the roads. From 16-20 July old Highway 4 from the Jap cut-off to the road junction outside Kiangan held more than 100 marooned vehicles, including a tank platoon and a quad-50 platoon. Working 24 hours a day the 6th

Engineers not only cleared old Highway 4 but, during the same time, also improvised a jeep bridge over the Ibulao River on the new highway route by anchoring captured trucks in the boulder-strewn stream bed and laying planking across the truck bodies. When the 63d was relieved in the Kiangan area by elements of the 20th Infantry, it had accounted for 2,383 dead Nips and 119 prisoners during the advance on and capture of the town. Its own losses for the period totalled 48 dead and 195 wounded or injured.

* * *

During the advance on Kiangan, the 1st Infantry had remained in reserve, with the exception of the 2d Battalion, which had been disposed along Highway 4 to the rear of the 63d units, guarding lines of communication with the aid of guerrilla troops. Company F during this period overran a strong enemy position southwest of Payawgan, accounting for more than sixty of the enemy in a battle that lasted several days, while other units of the battalion dispatched patrols along the Lamut River to protect the Division's left flank.

On 12 July the 1st Battalion of Semper Primus veterans relieved elements of the 63d near the destroyed Ibulao River bridge and, by 15 July, effected a crossing of the swift mountain stream to secure a bridgehead on the eastern bank against only scat-
tered resistance. Supplied initially by hand-carry across the footbridge that the engineers completed on the 16th, the battalion started the drive up Highway 4 toward the Division’s next objective—Banaue. Small enemy patrols and scattered strongpoints were encountered all along the route of approach, but these were quickly dispersed or destroyed either by the doughs or by the supporting fire of the 1st Field Artillery Battalion.

The chief difficulty here, as in the drive on Kiangnan, was supply for the forward elements and evacuation of wounded to the rear. The road that hugged the sheer cliffs along the Ibulao River gorge had been dynamited by the retreating Nips, leaving stretches up to 287 feet in length where the road bed had been blown away from the rocky mountainside. Supply and evacuation were handled by jeep and hand-carry, the jeeps being slung on cables around the impassable points. Filipino and Ifugao carriers were used throughout the operation, often carrying their precious burdens under enemy fire. One carrier was killed and two wounded by an enemy patrol that the 1st Battalion encountered as it was entering Banaue on 20 July, but supplies continued to move into the forward area.

Immediately upon securing the objective town, the battalion dispatched patrols north to Polis Pass where they were to contact the Philippine guerrilla forces, and east to Ducligan to make junction with the 11th Infantry (Philippine Army). While these patrols were accomplishing their missions, the 1st Infantry’s 3d Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion at Banaue and immediately sent out strong patrols to Ducligan and Gohang. Because of the impassable roads, supplies in the Banaue area were now handled largely by air drops and pack trains, but evacuation became an increasingly serious problem for it involved a hand-carry of more than nine miles.

The patrol sent to Ducligan secured the town on 28 July with no enemy contact, but the push towards Hapao was restricted by well organized positions located on key high ground stretching all along the route from Gohang to the objective town. By 31 July the 3d Battalion reinforced by the 1st Battalion of the 11th Infantry (Philippine Army) reached a position 1,000 yards east of the town and were facing a strong force of Japs dug in on a ridge fronting Hapao. Determined counterattacks during the next two days netted the 3d Battalion 235 enemy dead, and were followed by general advances to high ground east of town. The high rate of non-battle casualties, however, occasioned by the high fly population and the inaccessibility of potable water, was depleting the ranks of the attacking battalions. A water carrier had to make a four-hour round trip from the ridge positions, with a maximum load of two canteens as he clambered back on his hands and knees over the rough steep ground. The total strength of the two battalions was less than 500 when, on 11 August, they were relieved by the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry. Heavy rains limited the 1st Battalion’s activities to local patrols until 15 August, when all offensive operations in the Division zone ceased.

To the east of Banaue, elements of the 11th Infantry (Philippine Army) and the 1st Battalion of the 14th Infantry (Philippine Army), which had
stormed and taken Mayoyao on 8 August against stubborn resistance from the rock caves and well dug-in emplacements, were relieved by the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, which had secured Ducligan and Tulaid against light enemy resistance and had protected the supply lines of the 3d Battalion against frenzied counterattacks by enemy forces in the area. The relief was completed by 13 August and only local patrol activity was conducted until the cease-fire order on the 15th.

In the prolonged struggle for the hills surrounding Hapao, Staff Sergeant Winford A. Evans was acting platoon sergeant of a rifle platoon that, along with a company of Philippine Army men, was driven off a 4,500-foot hill position at 0300 31 July by a numerically superior enemy force. At 0905 the charging Fil-American troops retook the hill despite heavy losses from severe enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. Evans, leading a squad to reinforce the troops on the hill, reached the newly established defensive perimeter with an effective fighting strength of only three men. Seeing his platoon leader wounded, he dashed forward in the face of a heavy machine gun only fifty yards away and carried the officer forty yards to safety. Then assuming command of the platoon and the attached Filipinos, Evans set up a secondary line of defense when the Nip counterattackers threatened to overrun the first, crawled forward of the lines and directed effective 60mm mortar fire on the enemy positions, though himself wounded by an enemy mortar shell fragment. Seeing an enemy machine gun being set up in position to rake our line of defense, he crawled forward to within 25 yards of the enemy group, hurled four grenades into the position and sprayed the area with his tommy-gun, killing three and wounding the rest of the crew, who withdrew into the enemy lines. Evans, though weak from loss of blood and exhausted by his constant activity, ordered an immediate attack that resulted in the recapture of all lost ground and the death of an additional 53 of the enemy.
On 3 August Staff Sergeant Don J. Whitaker was leading a carrying party of 160 Philippine Army troops protected by a squad of Red Star riflemen along the treacherous mountain trail that led from Banaue to Hapao. Suddenly the lead scout was hit by a burst of machine-gun fire from a concealed enemy hilltop position, and rolled off the edge of the path, hanging to plant roots that kept him from falling to the raging mountain stream 100 feet below. Whitaker rushed forward under the fire of the enemy machine gun and twelve supporting riflemen to pull the scout up the cliff, apply a shoestring tourniquet and carry him back to safety. Halfway back, he lowered the wounded man in a covered spot, dragged a seriously wounded Filipino to a concealed position, resholed the wounded American and carried him across open country to the squad's perimeter. Whitaker then rushed back to the wounded Philippine Army man and carried him through enemy fire to safety. With the arrival of a friendly rifle company, he then directed heavy mortar fire on the enemy ambush, silencing the position and allowing the carrying party to accomplish its vital mission.

During the final operations in the Banaue-Hapao sector, Technical Sergeant Charles R. Griffith led a reconnaissance patrol into enemy territory, and ran into an enemy ambush when returning to his position. He killed two Nips with automatic rifle fire and, when the gun jammed, clubbed another to death with the stock. Picking up the rifle and ammunition of one of the fallen Japs, he killed two
more, then led his patrol down the trail to wipe out a strong enemy position that had first brought the men under fire. Private First Class John L. Neal, on another reconnaissance patrol that ran into an ambush, jumped into the enemy trench, killed three Nips and wounded several more, returning a short time later with his squad to wipe out the entire position.

In a frenzied banzai attack on 9 August Private First Class John T. Taylor was wounded and two of his machine-gun squad were killed. He remained at his post, however, helping to repel the first counterattack. He also remained in position during the second charge, affording his company time to withdraw to a secondary position and evacuate the wounded. When his area was retaken by the company the next morning, Taylor was found dead with his hands on the gun, surrounded by a semi-circular mound of dead Japs. During the same counterattack in another part of the perimeter, Private First Class Cecil Depew stayed at his gun cutting down the attacking Nips, although three covering riflemen had been killed by infiltrating enemy, leaving him alone in an exposed position. Forced to withdraw when he ran out of ammunition, Depew set up his gun in a new position to help repel the second frenzied attack.

Technician Third Grade Manfred I. Ellwanger, an aid man with the 1st Infantry, remained with a casualty in a forward position when the company was forced to withdraw. He pulled the wounded man into a draw, kept him hidden behind enemy lines for more than 24 hours until the company retook the hill on the following day. Technician Fourth Grade Michael W. Turr evacuated two casualties from a forward area, administering first aid to them before caring for the wound in his own leg, while Private First Class Philip Schuback saved the lives of two men by advancing 400 yards in front of our positions, moving by short rushes, to carry the men back to safety.

In the Mayoyao area, Lieutenant Colonel Donald D. Blackburn commanded the Filipino regiment that stormed that fortress town, working tirelessly under the worst possible conditions to accomplish his mission. Artillery support was not available because of the terrain, air support was denied him because of the adverse weather, and evacuation of casualties involved a hand-carry of forty miles, yet Lieutenant Colonel Blackburn personally directed the operations of his forward troops to seize the town and the commanding ground around it. In the same area Lieutenant John H. Allan of the 1st Infantry organized his platoon to repel an early morning banzai charge by 100 riflemen, supported by several knee mortars. Exposing himself repeatedly to enemy fire in order to direct friendly fire, Allan led the platoon in a stubborn defense that netted 52 enemy dead.

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The 20th Infantry, which relieved the 63d in the Kiangnan area on 24 July, was assigned two missions: to attack and seize Kiangiang, and to destroy bypassed enemy groups to the south of Kiangnan. The first mission was taken over by the 1st Battalion, which by 26 July had advanced to within 400 yards of Pacdan, where it met serious opposition from a
steep heavily wooded razorback ridge southwest of town. An attempt by Company B to advance over the crest of the ridge was driven back by withering fire from reinforced caves on the reverse slope and adjacent spurs. Following heavy air, artillery and mortar concentrations, which included 4,000 rounds thrown by Division Artillery, 4,000 rounds of high explosive and white phosphorus by the 4.2 mortars, 8,000 rounds of 81mm projectiles and 26,000 gallons of Napalm, the Sykesmen with 1st Battalion, Buenavista Regiment attached, stormed the almost vertical cliffs under constant fire from the spider-holes and caves that covered the crest and succeeded in securing the strong position and holding it against a determined enemy counterattack. Pacdan itself was taken on 31 July against only light opposition.

The drive was preceded by a seven-hour armistice on 24 July, devised to allow enemy elements to surrender in comparative safety. Publicized by leaflets dropped or fired into enemy territory and by public address broadcasts from a low-flying Cub, the truce was scrupulously observed by the Sightseers but resulted in no surrenders. Instead, artillery observers near Objective Hill could see the Nips scurrying about preparing more positions and camouflage near the top of the hill. Within three minutes of the truce’s end, artillery fire was levelled at the new emplacements and seventeen dazed Japs walked out of the shelled area to give themselves up. The artillery fire which succeeded where surrender appeals had failed marked the start of one of the campaign’s most intensive periods of artillery concentrations. In the one area of Objective Hill, the Red Star artillerymen fired 96 tons of 105mm, 53 tons of 155, and 30 tons of 8-inch howitzer shells into the enemy positions, softening up the seemingly impregnable hill fortress for the advance of the doughboys.

Continuing the advance northwest to Kiangkiang, the 1st Battalion ran into the two-mile horseshoe ridge dominated by Mt. Puloy, which blocks all
approaches to the objective town. After repeated attempts to storm the ridge, opposed by artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire as well as heavy rains and dense fog, Company B reached a position only 500 yards from the crest, but there the attack bogged down. While Company C probed along trails to the southwest of Pacdan seeking an alternate route around Mt. Puloy, Company A drove to the crest of a knife-like ridge just southeast of the mountain. Attempts to attack from this position were repulsed by heavy fire and almost impenetrable jungle-like terrain. Elements of the 2d Battalion joined the attack on 10 August, but were halted short of the crest by artillery fire from cave positions so placed that our artillery fire was unable to reach the enemy guns. Many of the enemy were killed when they attempted strong counterattacks against company perimeters. By 15 August, the Sykesmen had pushed their way to within 200 yards of the crest, but the top of Mt. Puloy was still in enemy hands.

The second mission of the 20th, the destruction of hostile forces south of Kiangan, was assigned to the 2d Battlion. Elements of the battalion advanced toward the center of the Jap resistance in the area of Antipolo, wiping out small enemy groups and securing the towns of Palao and Duit. The battalion had advanced to within fifteen hundred yards of Antipolo when it was ordered north to assist the 3d Battalion in its assault against Mt. Puloy. The 2d Battalion of the 63d Infantry completed the operations against Antipolo, meeting only slight resistance from disorganized Japs. Patrols in the area were meeting no resistance when the cease-fire order on 15 August ended offensive operations.

There were many examples of Sykesmen doing a good job during the action in the Puloy and Antipolo areas. Corporal Melvin Mayfield, lineman for one of the Sykesmen's 81mm mortar observation posts, accompanied a Philippine Army battalion in an advance up a steep ridge adjoining Mt. Puloy. When the Filipinos were pinned down by intense fire, Mayfield continued the advance alone, moving by rushes up the steep slope into a converging fire from countless enemy emplacements. Sprinting across open ground for the last few yards, he attacked a cave position with white phosphorus grenades, destroying the emplacement and killing the occupants. Ignoring the increasingly heavy enemy fire directed at him, he continued charging emplacements in the Nips' outer line of defense, netting four cave positions destroyed and at least seven enemy killed before he ran out of ammunition. Although his left hand and carbine were rendered
Fennewald worked his way behind the enemy lines, used rifle and grenade fire to kill three and drive the remaining four Nips into the point-blank fire of his platoon; Lieutenant Elmer W. Bern killed five in a hilltop assault, received grenade fragments in his legs while evacuating a wounded man, but nevertheless carried him to safety before attending to his own wounds; Private First Class Leo A. Huppe deliberately drew enemy fire to locate the position that had pinned down his company, charged the position alone, killing three with grenades and bayonet, then cleaned out several adjacent spider-holes.

Counterattacks were frequent in the area. A midnight attack was launched on 30 July at the hilltop position held by Sykesmen under Technical Sergeant Peter A. Herauf, heavy weapons platoon sergeant. He held his fire until the Nips were close to the perimeter, then ordered a withering fire that decimated the ranks of the attackers. When the remaining Nips sought cover in such positions that our machine guns could not be depressed sufficiently to engage them, Herauf rose to a standing position, exposing himself to enemy fire, and fired from the hip, continuing to fire despite severe burns on his hands and arms. When a second counterattack

useless by enemy slugs, he returned to the hesitant Filipinos, obtained more grenades, and encouraged a light machine-gun squad to accompany him on the return trip. After killing two more of the enemy and destroying another emplacement, Mayfield rallied the forward elements of the Philippine Army battalion and led them in storming the hill and tearing wide open the Jap outer defensive system, accounting for thirty dead and the destruction of all enemy positions on the ridge.

Staff Sergeant Norman M. Tellefon, advancing on a machine-gun position, killed two Nip riflemen with grenades, worked his way up to the emplacement, killed two more with his rifle, destroyed the gun with grenades, then carried one of our wounded men back to the aid station; Staff Sergeant William K. Watts alone assaulted an enemy position that had pinned down a supply party, killing three and scattering the remaining enemy, then directed mortar fire on another position in a near-by draw, netting three enemy and one machine gun destroyed; Private First Class Yandall G. Cambron led the way up a steep hill, killing four snipers before losing his life near the crest; Private First Class Paul F.
began, he crawled from his position to a machine gun which had been abandoned by Filipino guards because of operational difficulties, quickly repaired the gun while enemy riflemen poured lead at him, then again stood up and fired from the hip, driving the enemy back. When the attack was repulsed, 36 enemy dead were found directly in front of Herauf’s position.

During another banzai attack Private First Class Albert L. Barnes caused the attacking enemy to flee in panic when he stood up to empty his rifle into the oncoming ranks, then picked up a BAR and charged the Nips, killing seven and wounding many others. Sergeant John A. Fann, after reorganizing a guerrilla unit that had been forced back, killed four of the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. Private First Class Sammie Isaac ran fifty yards across open terrain to repair and man an abandoned machine gun, killed two attackers and accounted for several more by use of grenades when he ran out of machine-gun ammunition. Staff Sergeant Byron B. Boose emptied two rifles into the charging Japs, killing several, then killed the remaining attacker with a vertical butt stroke. Charged by three Japs in his one-man foxhole, Private First Class McKinley L. Knight killed one with rifle fire and two with butt strokes, then borrowed the rifle and ammuni-

tion of one of his victims to fire at Nips attacking nearby positions. Private First Class Tommie L. Moran killed four when he took over an unmanned machine gun, then carried the gun at his hip and charged the enemy in a nearby draw, killing four more. After taking over another unmanned machine gun to help repulse the first counterattack, Sergeant John T. Edwards prevented a second by crawling forward of the lines and lobbing white phosphorus grenades into the enemy concentrating for a renewed charge on our positions. During one of the last counterattacks, word was sent back to the command post, more than 1,000 yards away, that blood plasma was needed immediately for several badly wounded men. First Sergeant Woodrow W. Cole and Private First Class Roy R. Erner stumbled through a blinding rain over treacherous mountain trails where a misstep on the slippery ground meant a long fall, to carry the vital plasma to the front-line positions.

All during the Division’s operations over the most rugged terrain encountered on Luzon, Div Arty kept its units well forward in support of the infantrymen’s drives, despite poor road conditions, bad weather and supply difficulties. Elements of the 1st and 80th Field Artillery Battalions, after working their guns forward to the Ibula River, had
moved up Highway 4 near Guruq in support of the 1st Infantry to set up their guns on the narrow road itself, since heavy woods and steep gorges prevented the use of any adjacent position. The 51st Field Artillery had wheeled its guns into position in Kiangan after moving them up the long and arduous route from the Lamut River, to be followed by the artillermen of the 53d Field Artillery Battalion, who supported the final drives in the Kiangan area. Because of the bad weather, air support was unreliable during the fighting in Mountain Province, and the doughboys relied more and more on the well-placed fire of the supporting artillery.

Red Star artillermen who won the fervent praise of the doughboys include Lieutenant Shannon P. Cox who, on receiving a radio call for blood plasma, took off in his Cub plane when all flights had been cancelled because of adverse weather, made twelve low runs to drop the precious cargo from tree-top height to our troops in the Kiangan area, constantly flying through heavy enemy ground fire that was doubly dangerous because of the necessity of repeating the flight patterns in order to assure prompt locating of the air drops by doughboy-medics. In the Bolog area, observer Lieutenant Stanley C. Scribner and radioman Sergeant Robert E. Anderson advanced ahead of the infantry troops when heavy machine-gun fire caused the doughs to withdraw, and directed artillery fire on the enemy positions that had forced the withdrawal, though Anderson was killed by sniper fire before the last position was destroyed. When another artillery observation post was hit by heavy machine-gun fire, Captain Perry R. Ellsworth ran thirty yards across open terrain to take over an unmanned light machine gun, and sprayed the enemy positions to cover the evacuation of a seriously wounded soldier by Private First Class Robert L. Gum.

When the cease-fire order was issued on 15 August the 6th Infantry Division was the most heavily engaged division in the U.S. Army, facing the last large groups of organized enemy in the Pacific war. During their stay in the Cordillera Mountains of northern Luzon, the Sightseers had killed 7,792 Japs and captured 925, had chased Yamashita and his troops over the razor-backed ridges and in and out of cave strongholds until the "Tiger of Malaya" had gained a reputation as the "Gopher of Luzon." In performing these feats under the most difficult conditions of terrain and supply, the Division had lost 99 men killed and 432 wounded and injured.

On 16 August, when the Division was alerted for occupation duties in Japan, the incredulous doughboys, artillermen, engineers, medics, recon troopers and communication men filed out of the mountains with 219 days of continuous combat, showing in their eyes, but the promise of peace in their smiles. World War II was over.
CHAPTER 20
END OF WORLD WAR II

DURING the first two weeks of August 1945 incredible rumors and even more incredible news reports had spread by word of mouth from foxhole to foxhole in the rugged Cordilleras. Veterans of seven months of unbroken combat ridiculed the reports; to many it seemed that they had always lived in mud and fought over mountain peaks and that they always would regardless of events in the outside world. But official confirmation of Russia’s entry into the war, of the atomic bombs and of the peace offer and acceptance erased some of the lines that had seemed indelibly etched in the mud-caked faces of the front-line troops.

There was little wild jubilation among the combat soldiers. For one thing, they were too tired; for another, there were too many friends who had not lived to see the day of victory; and for still a third, they were not sure that the isolated Nips to their front knew that their Emperor had ordered them to surrender. But relief of the front-line Sightseers took place without incident, and the Luzon campaign became a thing of the past.

Red Star veterans preparing for their first peace-time assignment could look back on a combat record unsurpassed by any division in the Army. The 6th Infantry Division had been the only division in the entire Pacific war to carry the attack to a determined enemy for 219 consecutive days, facing the enemy’s infantry, artillery and armored units in all corners of Luzon. The 6th had met and annihilated the greatest concentration of enemy armor encountered by any American unit in the Pacific theater. Wearers of the Red Star had been the first troops on Luzon to face the terrifying 8-inch rockets and 150mm mortars that the enemy had used in a vain attempt to prevent the shattering of the Shimbu Line. They had stormed the mountain peaks of the Sierra Madres, Rosario, Bataan and the Cabaruan Hills to dislodge and destroy strongly entrenched enemy troops. Division Artillery had fired more than 255,-
000 rounds at the enemy strongpoints, totalling almost 13,000,000 pounds of flying death. During the Luzon campaign, the Sightseers had killed 20,480 of the enemy and captured 1,369, an average of 100 enemy casualties per day for more than seven months. During the same period the Division lost 853 killed in action or dead of wounds, 3,122 wounded or injured in action, and 6 missing.

There were many Sightseers who spent little or no time in the front lines but without whom the combat troops could not have won their victories. The Division’s service units, besides furnishing re-

placements to the line companies when casualties were high, performed vital work that always involved sweat and often danger. They fought the terrain, bad roads, worse weather, and frequently they had to fight the enemy to get supplies and equipment to the front. Throughout the campaign the 6th Quartermaster Company kept forward supply points within only a few miles of the forward elements to assure a steady stream of rations, POL and other supplies to the units. The 706th Ordnance (Light Maintenance) Company kept ammunition moving to the points where it was most needed, repaired everything from watches to artillery pieces in its shops, and set excellent examples of ingenuity for other units by improvising washing machines, hot-water showers and even a one-cylinder run-about. Both Quartermaster and Ordnance were aided in their work by guerrilla perimeter guards, whose firing helped keep the men awake during the frequent spells of night work.

The 6th Medical Battalion and attached medical units performed yeoman service under almost impossible conditions of terrain and supply. Litter-bearer teams and ambulances covered long distances over mountain trails or washed-out roads, and two hospital units servicing the troops in the Kian-gan and Banaue areas were hand-carried through the mountains and over the Ibulao River gorge so that the doughs might receive prompt medical attention. Communication between the rapidly advancing units presented a gigantic problem that was solved only by the unyielding efforts of the men of the 6th Signal Company. Thousands of miles of
wire were laid across ridges, through wooded draws and often across country held by enemy forces; radio operators under constant artillery and small-arms fire in the forward observation posts or on reconnaissance missions kept their radios going when all other means of communication had been disrupted by enemy fire or patrols; switchboard and teletype personnel handled more than 1,000 calls daily throughout the period, and message center resembled the old Pony Express in modern jeeps.

The exploits of the 6th Engineer Combat Battalion in building roads and bridges through the most rugged battlefields of Luzon have already been described. In addition, they furnished demolition teams for destruction of pillboxes and sealing of caves; Technical Sergeant M. I. Hill supervised the placing of water points in both forward and rear areas, often having to withdraw his forward positions to the protection of a company perimeter during the night and return to the water point the next morning to continue servicing the combat troops; and the engineers supervised construction activities in all Division sectors, providing what comfort was possible under battle conditions.

Other units also played their part in the final victory. The 6th Infantry Division Band, in addition to their regular duties of entertaining the men when entertainment was possible, were used as perimeter guards for the Division's rear echelon; 237th Chemical Service Platoon kept the chemical mortars regularly supplied with vast quantities of ammunition that played a large part in the destruction of mountain strongpoints; the Military Police Platoon guarded vital installations, picked up suspected spies and saboteurs, and tracked down enemy stragglers; and the medical detachments and service companies of the infantry regiments and field artillery battalions kept their units operating at maximum efficiency despite the seemingly interminable combat and impassable roads.

Sightseers pulling out of the hills for the first time in more than seven months recalled many
moments that had relieved the deadly monotony of combat: the company barber who turned to find a bedraggled Nip soldier smiling and bowing, shaved him, and put up a sign offering free shaves to any Japs who surrendered; the Red Star officer who captured a Nip lieutenant and suddenly recognized him as a fellow member of the Oxford University baseball team of his college days; the rescue of a small colony of Belgian priests and nuns who had been hiding in the hills among the Ifugao tribesmen; the constant firing of trigger-happy guerrillas who lined the supply roads with an impenetrable wall of lead; the fresh eager look of replacements who landed in Manila one morning and were fighting in the hills of the Shimbu Line that same night; the medics who delivered Filipino babies between combat missions; the pack trains made up of captured Jap horses and saddles that filed past stalled or marooned vehicles to carry supplies beyond the Ibulao gorge; the girls and whiskey, both bad, that seemed to be Manila’s two chief industries during the first few weeks in the liberated city; the Division Rest Camp that provided several days of relaxation and bunk fatigue for weary veterans pulled out of the front lines a few at a time; the Jap artillery shell that landed in the middle of the first beer ration that one of the 63d’s companies had received on Luzon; the exorbitant prices that Filipinos, and Chinese learned to charge for worthless souvenirs and the GIs who cheerfully paid same; the “dotty clodes” women who swarmed around every command post; and the five-minute furloughs enjoyed by the men when mail was delivered to front-line positions.

The Red Star had another month to spend on Luzon after the cessation of hostilities. After moving to San Juan on the shore of Lingayen Gulf, only a few miles from where they had first set foot on Philippine soil, the Division reorganized, rested, discharged its high-point men for the happy journey home, trained ever-growing numbers of replacements, and prepared for its next mission, which had been changed at the last moment to the occupation of Korea. On 10 October the bulk of the Division steamed out of Lingayen Gulf, through the China Sea and into Inch’on on Korea’s west coast. By 19 October the command posts were established in the assigned areas and the Sightseeing Sixth had added another job and another area to its long list of successful missions in far-off lands.

Overseas for more than two years, the Division had spent a total of 306 days in actual combat—87 days in New Guinea and 219 consecutive days in Luzon. Casualties among the Sightseers for the entire period of combat totalled 1,174 dead, 3,876 wounded and 9 missing, while the enemy lost over 23,000 dead and 1,700 captured.

Ahead for the Red Star Division were only peacetime duties and further opportunities for peaceful sightseeing. Veterans leaving for home and discharge, men who had seen wartime sights that would grow dim with the passing years, would soon remember most clearly the friendships they formed and the experiences they shared with the fighting men of the 6th Infantry Division.